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Abstract. In this paper, we consider how a company that has the flexibility to produce two substitutable products
would determine optimal capacity levels and prices for these products in a single-period problem. We first consider
the case where the firm is a price taker but can determine optimal capacity levels for both products. We then consider
the case where the firm can set the price for one product and the optimal capacity level for the other. Finally, we
consider the case where capacity is fixed for both products, but the firm can set prices. For each case, we examine
the sensitivity of optimal prices and capacities to the problem parameters. Finally, we consider the case where
each product is managed by a product manager trying to maximize individual product profits rather than overall
firm profits and analyze how optimal price and capacity decisions are affected.
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1. Introduction
Firms must continuously make pricing and capacity decisions to respond to market forces.
Facing uncertain demand, firms must balance pricing and production decisions to respond to
the market. Many firms produce a variety of products, some of which may be substitutable
by consumers. Product substitutability makes pricing and capacity decisions more difficult
due to the firm’s needs to consider the effect that a change in the price of one product is going
to have on the demand level for another. A good example is in electronics manufacturing,
where a firm might produce a variety of chips. The price of a faster chip affects the demand
for a slower chip as well, since, if the prices for the two types of chips are sufficiently close,
many customers might opt for the faster chip, thereby significantly decreasing demand for
the slower chip.
In this paper, we study single-period pricing and capacity-setting decisions for a firm
that has the flexibility to produce two substitutable products. We assume that this firm
produces these products on two separate production lines. Furthermore, we do not assume
that these products are perfect substitutes for each other. That is, we consider the case where
customers have preferences for one product or the other, but this preference is affected by
the price levels of both products. (For example, even a dedicated beef eater might switch
to chicken if the price of beef becomes considerably more expensive than chicken.)
Due to the difference in prices, we assume, however, that shortages in one product do not
necessarily lead customers to immediately select the other. As an example, consider the case
of individuals deciding what type of car to buy. If the Toyota Motor Company fixes the prices
of its Lexus LS400 to be the same (or only slight above) the Camry, it is likely that many
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customers will switch to buying the Lexus. On the other hand, with a price difference of
nearly $30,000 right now, rarely do shortages in Camries suddenly convince many potential
Camry buyers to buy a Lexus LS400 instead. We therefore consider substitutability due to
price differential and not due to shortages in one product line. Our aim is to build intuition
on how pricing and capacity decisions change as a function of costs, demand functions,
and preexisting capacity levels; we therefore focus on simple single-period models. This
also enables us to contrast our results with the famous news vendor problem, which is a
single-period problem where the capacity (production level) for only a single product is
chosen.
We also focus on the issue of centralized versus decentralized decision making and
how this affects the nature of the decisions. Many firms assign a product manager to each
product the firm produces. The product manager’s role is to maximize the profits made by
that product. If all products are produced on separate production lines and the products are
not substitutable, the decisions made by each product manager trying to maximize product
profits correspond to decisions made by a centralized controller maximizing systemwide
profits. The more interesting case is when products are substitutable; in that case, we analyze
when the system-optimal decisions are the same as the individual product-optimal decisions.
The classic problem where price is known and capacity is uncertain is the news vendor
problem. Many extensions of this classic problem have been made. For example, Ismail
and Louderback (1979), Lau (1980), and Kabak and Schiff (1978) studied a one prod-
uct news vendor problem where the probability of achieving a predetermined profit level
is maximized. Ismail and Louderback (1979), Sankarasubramanian and Kumaraswamy
(1983), and Lau and Lau (1988) studied a single product news vendor problem where the
demand level is dependent on the price set. Therefore, both optimal price and optimal order
quantity are determined. Li, Lau, and Lau (1990) focused on a two product news vendor
problem where the probability of achieving a profit target is maximized.
A variety of attempts have been made to introduce the effects of capacity constraints on
the price and production decisions in the news vendor problem. Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) examined a problem where two identical firms compete with products that are perfect
substitutes. The demand for each product is a function of its own price. The two firms
enter into a two-stage competition, where they set capacities in the first stage and make
pricing decisions independently in the second stage. Staiger and Wolak (1992) focused on
two firms that produce the same product and have the same capacity costs. They analyzed
an infinitely repeated game where prices are adjusted periodically and examine the effects
of having excess capacity. Lippman and McCardle (1997) considered a market for a single
commodity-type product where the demand is allocated to each competitor under various
allocation schemes.
Examples of research involving substitutable products include Ignall and Veinott (1969),
who examine the optimality of myopic policies with several products; Bassok, Anupindi,
and Akella (1993), Bitran and Dasu (1992), Hsu and Bassok (1994), and Gerchak, Tripathy,
and Wang (1996) studied ordering policies with substitutable products; while Carmon and
Nahmias (1994) examined lot-sizing decisions in semiconductor manufacturing where the
products are substitutable. In this line of research, it is assumed that the manufacturer is a
price taker for all of its products.
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We study the case of a firm producing two products with price-dependent demands, where
the firm has the ability to make pricing or capacity decisions for one or both of its products.
We begin in Section 2 by discussing the case where a firm is a price taker for both of its
products but has control over the amount of capacity to install for each product. In Section 3,
we analyze the situation of a firm that needs to decide on the amount of capacity to install
for one of its products and the price to set for the other product. This is a situation facing
firms that introduce a new or improved product with the potential to cannibalize sales from
its existing product and where the firm has only a limited amount of capacity on-line for this
new product. An example of this would be a microchip manufacturer launching the next
generation of microchip after its existing product has been cloned. In Section 4, we examine
the case where both products have a given capacity constraint and the firm sets prices for
both products. This situation is commonplace for firms that have no ability to increase
capacity in the near term but can control sales and profits only by adjusting their prices.
We end in Section 5 with a discussion on how the decisions made in the previous sections
differ when decisions regarding price or capacity are made sequentially instead of simulta-
neously. These situations can arise when a firm has different brand managers making deci-
sions to maximize each product’s profit independently rather than maximizing systemwide
profits. Porteus and Whang (1991) discuss incentive strategies to induce manufacturing
managers and product managers to act in the best interest of a company as a whole. Whang
(1995) notes that the research to date in cross-functional coordination of manufacturing and
marketing has focused on the coordination between manufacturing and marketing for either
a single product or multiple independent products. In our paper, we will examine the case
where the demand for both products is dependent.
We use the following notation throughout the paper:
Pa= price of productA;
Pb= price of productB;
Ca= production capacity for productA;
Cb= production capacity for productB;
qa= per unit variable cost of productA;
qb= per unit variable cost of productB;
ia= cost of adding one unit of dedicated capacity for productA;
i b= cost of adding one unit of dedicated capacity for productB;
ua(Pa, Pb)=mean demand for productA;
ub(Pa, Pb)=mean demand for productB.
For analytical simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that
1. The demands for productAandB are distributed uniformly over the intervals [ua(Pa, Pb)
− r, ua(Pa, Pb)+ r ] and [ub(Pa, Pb)− s, ub(Pa, Pb)+ s], wherer ands are the ranges
of realizable demands above and below their respective means.
We assume further that
2. The unit investment costs plus variable production costs do not exceed the product price:
ia+qa < Pa andi b+qb < Pb with ia,qa, i b,qb > 0.
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3. The mean demand of productA, ua(Pa, Pb), is decreasing inPa and increasing inPb
and the mean demand of productB is increasing inPa and decreasing inPb.
Note that assumption 3 follows immediately from the fact that the products are substi-
tutable. We finally define the variable profit function for productsA andB to be
π(·, ·) = (Pa−qa) ·
∫ Ca
ua(Pa,Pb)−r
xa · fa(Pa, Pb, xa) dxa
+ (Pa−qa) · Ca ·
∫ ua(Pa,Pb)+r
Ca




xb · fb(Pa, Pb, xb) dxb
+ (Pb−qb) ·Cb ·
∫ ua(Pa,Pb)+s
Cb
fb(Pa, Pb, xb) dxb
where
fa(Pa, Pb, xa) = 1/2r andxa is the demand for productA;
fb(Pa, Pb, xb) = 1/2s andxb is the demand for productB.
2. Capacity decisions for a price-taking firm
We begin our discussion with a firm that manufactures two products and must decide on
the amount of capacity to install to manufacture each product. In this situation, the firm
is a price taker in both of the markets in which it competes. For this situation, Lau and
Lau (1988) provide a solution procedure for determining the optimal capacities to achieve
a given probability of obtaining a profit target. In our model, we maximize the expected
profit and derive the sensitivity of the optimal capacities to changes in key parameters.
The firm’s profit function is defined as
R(Ca,Cb) = π(Ca,Cb)− ia ·Ca − i b ·Cb. (1)
We first show that a unique set of capacities exists that maximizes equation (1).
Proposition 1. If Pa > qa > 0 and Pb > qb > 0, then there exists a unique maximum of
(1) over Ca > 0 and Cb > 0. The optimal capacities are
Ca = [ua(Pa, Pb)+ r ]− 2 · ia · r
(Pa−qa) and
Cb = [ub(Pa, Pb)+ s]− 2 · ib · s
(Pb − qb) .
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Proof: To ensure that a unique maximum exists for positive values ofCa andCb, a solution
must exist to the first order conditions and all second order conditions must be satisfied.
The first order conditions are
∂R(Ca,Cb)
∂Ca
= −ia− Ca · (Pa−qa)
2r





= −i b− Cb · (Pb−qb)
2s
+ [ub(Pa, Pb)+ s] · (Pb−qb)
2s
= 0
Rearranging these terms, we obtain
C∗a = [ua(Pa, Pb)+ r ] −
2 · ia · r






C∗b = [ub(Pa, Pb)+ s] −
2 · i b · s






which are positive by assumption 2 that some profit can be earned on each product.
The sufficient conditions for the existence of a maximum are
∂2R(Ca,Cb)
∂C2a













= (Pa − qa)(Pb − qb)
4rs
> 0,
which both hold by assumption 2, completing the proof. 2
We now turn our attention to how the optimal capacity decisions vary with changes in
the key parameters of the model.
Proposition 2. The changes in the optimal capacity mix due to changes in the parameters
are
1. If Pa increases, then Ca decreases if| ∂ua(Pa,Pb)∂Pa | >
2 · ia · r
(Pa−qa)2 and Cb increases;
2. If Pb increases, then Ca increases and Cb decreases if| ∂ub(Pa,Pb)∂Pb | >
2 · ib · s
(Pb−qb)2 ;
3. If qa increases, then Ca decreases and Cb does not change;
4. If qb increases, then Ca does not change and Cb decreases;
5. If i a increases, then Ca decreases and Cb does not change;
6. If i b increases, then Ca does not change and Cb decreases;
7. If r increases, then Ca increases if ia < (Pa − qa)/2 and Cb does not change;
8. If s increases, then Ca does not change and Cb increases if ib < (Pb − qb)/2.
Proof: We show the methodology for change 1. The proofs of the other cases are similar.
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From Eq. (2), we know that
Ca = [ua(Pa, Pb)+ r ] − 2 · ia · r
(Pa − qa) .





+ 2 · ia · r
(Pa − qa)2 .
Since ∂ua(Pa,Pb)
∂Pa
< 0 by assumption 3, we therefore conclude thatCa will decrease if
| ∂ua(Pa,Pb)
∂Pa
| > 2 · ia · r
(Pa−qa)2 whenPa increases.
Similarly, from Eq. (3), we know that









Therefore, we conclude thatCb always will increase asPa increases. 2
Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 point to an interesting phenomenon; namely, that an
expectation of a price increase in a product that will result in a decrease in the mean demand
for that product does not necessarily result in the firm decreasing the available capacity for
that product. Essentially, the condition in part 1 shows that, if the mean decrease in demand
is not fast enough and the cost of capacity is not too expensive, in some cases, it may
be more profitable to increase capacity for that product. This is because, even though on
average there is less demand for that product, the unit profit may be higher and therefore
more capacity might be profitable. The following example shows the possible behaviors
for Ca mentioned previously.
In the following examples, we assume both demands are uniformly distributed. The
mean demand for productA is defined asC − c1Pa + c2Pb andr is the range of possible
demand values. For productB, the mean demand is defined asD − d1Pa + d2Pb ands is
the range of possible demand values.
Example 1, Case A. Ca and Cb both increase with an increase in Pa. In this case, letqa= 3,
qb= 2, C= 2000,c1= 60,c2= 50,r = 400,D= 3000,d1= 100,d2= 19,s= 250,ia= 1,
i b= 1, Pa= 6, andPb= 10. Here, the optimal solution isCa= 2273.33,Cb= 2301.5, and
R(Ca,Cb)= 18592.58.
If we increasePa from 6 to 7, we observe thatCa increases to 2280,Cb increases to
2320.5 andR(Ca,Cb) increases to 20652.25.
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Example 1, Case B. Ca decreases and Cb increases with an increase in Pa. For this
example, supposeqa= 3,qb= 2,C= 2000,c1= 60,c2= 50,r = 400,D= 3000,d1= 100,
d2= 19,s= 250,ia= 1, i b= 1, Pa= 10, andPb= 10. In this case, the optimal solution is
Ca= 2185.71,Cb= 2377.5, andR(Ca,Cb)= 26168.39.
By increasingPa to 11, we find that the optimalCa decreases to 2140, the optimalCb
increases to 2396.5, andR(Ca,Cb) increases to 27774.25.
Similarly, parts 7 and 8 of Proposition 2 show that an increase in the variability of demand
for a product may result in an increase or a decrease of the capacity for that product. If
the ranges of demand increase, the firm will choose to purchase more capacity, provided
the per unit investment cost for capacity is less than half the variable per unit profit made
on the product. However, changes in variable production or capacity costs always have
monotonic consequences on optimal capacity levels. As the production or investment costs
for a product increase, the product’s profit margin clearly is reduced and so the optimal
strategy will be to reduce amount of capacity kept on hand to produce that product.
3. Setting the price ofA and the capacity level ofB
In this section, we suppose that a firm currently has fixed (limited) capacity for a new
product it is introducing but must decide how much capacity to maintain for its existing
product. For example, in electronics manufacturing, when a firm first introduces a new
product the capacity is extremely limited due to low yields for the new product and the
necessary time for the factory to ramp up for production (e.g., building a new faster chip).
On the other hand, the older product that the firm produces may already be a stable product
in a market with active competition. For the older product, the firm might have the option
to change its capacity; however, it is a price taker for it. Therefore, the firm faces the joint
problem of setting a capacity level for one product and a price level for the other.
In this situation, the firm’s profit function is defined as
R(Pa,Cb)=π(Pa,Cb)− i b ·Cb.
In this section and the next, we assume linear mean demand functions. In particular, we
assume that
4. The mean demand of productA, ua(Pa, Pb)=C− c1Pa+ c2Pb > 0 andub(Pa, Pb)=
D− d1Pa+ d2Pb > 0.
The use of such linear functions to model product demands is widespread in the eco-
nomics literature (see Bulow, 1982; Stokey, 1981). We also assume that
5. c1 > c2 > 0, d1 > d2 > 0, c1 > d2 > 0, andd1 > c2 > 0.
Note that these assumptions are reasonable for the following reasons:
414 J.R. BIRGE, J. DROGOSZ AND I. DUENYAS
• The assumption thatc1> c2 and d1> d2 means that the demand function for
product A is more sensitive to changes in the price of productA than changes in
the price of productB (and similarly for the demand function for productB).
• The assumption thatc1 > d2 (andd1 > c2) ensures that an increase in the price of
a product cannot increase overall demand, since for example, increasing the price of
productA would decrease the mean demand forA more than it would increase the
mean demand forB (i.e., one cannot create extra demand by increasing the prices of
both products).
We also note that, in this section and the next, it is easy to show that an optimal policy
always will set prices (for products for which prices are being set and capacity is fixed) in
such a way that the minimum realizable demand is always less than or equal to the capacity
for that product. To see this, note that, if the reverse were true, increasing prices to the level
where the minimum realizable demand equals capacity increases per unit revenue without
affecting actual realized sales for that product, while increasing the demand for the other
product.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions1 through5, the function R(Pa,Cb) achieves a unique
maximum over Pa > qa > 0 and Cb > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A. 2
Once again, we are interested in how the optimal decisions change as a function of the
optimal parameters.
Proposition 4. Assuming the conditions in Proposition3,
1. If qa increases, then Pa increases and Cb increases;
2. If qb increases, then Pa decreases and Cb decreases;
3. If i b increases, then Pa decreases and Cb decreases;
4. If C increases, then Pa increases and Cb increases;
5. If c1 increases, then Pa decreases and Cb decreases;
6. If c2 increases, then Pa increases and Cb increases;
7. If D increases, then Pa does not change and Cb increases;
8. If d1 increases, then Pa does not change and Cb decreases;
9. If d2 increases, then Pa increases and Cb increases;
10. If Ca increases, Pa and Cb decrease.
Proof: See Appendix B for the proof of part 1. The proofs for parts 2 through 9 are
analagous to the proof of part 1. In the case of part 10, where we increaseCa, w have four
potential cases: (a)Pa andCb increase, (b)Pa increases andCb decreases, (c)Pa decreases
andCb increases, (d)Pa andCb decrease.
Cases (a) and (b) are not possible, since given the added capacity, one would never
increase price. IfPa increases, then demand will decrease for productA and increase for
productB. If this strategy improved profits in case a, it would have been done at the lower
level of capacity for productA. In case (b), if the price ofA increased, we would not
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decrease the capacity of productB, since it would be in greater demand. We also may
discard (c) as a plausible outcome, given that, whenPa decreases, demand for productB
also will decrease. Hence, we would not want to increase the capacity of productB. If
this strategy would improve the overall profits, it would have been implemented under the
initial capacity level ofA. Therefore, we are left with the conclusion that asCa increases,
Pa andCb decrease. 2
We now present an example showing the various potential behaviors that can occur when
Pb changes.
Example 2. When Pb is changed, we may observe different behaviors in the decision
variables. We now provide examples of the three possible behaviors that can occur when
we increasePb.
Example 2, Case A. Pa and Cb increase. In this case letCa= 500, qa= 2, qb= 2,
C= 2000,c1= 100,c2= 99, r = 420, D= 3000,d1= 100,d2= 10, s= 1000,i b= 1, and
Pb= 5. Here, the optimal solution isPa= 18.24,Cb= 3015.8, andR(Pa,Cb)= 12218.8.
If we increasePb from 5 to 6, we observe thatPa increases to 19.16,Cb increases to
3091.628, andR(Pa,Cb) increases to 15006.61.
Example 2, Case B. Pa increases and Cb decreases. For this example, supposeCa= 500,
qa= 2, qb= 2, C= 2000, c1 = 350, c2= 18, r = 420, D= 3000, d1= 100, d2= 99,
s= 1000,i b= 1, andPb= 15. We obtain an optimal solution ofPa= 5.29,Cb= 2869.44,
andR(Pa,Cb)= 24510.26.
By increasingPb to 16, we find that the optimalPa increases to 5.34, the optimalCb
decreases to 2785.52, andR(Pa,Cb) increases to 25312.3.
Example 2, Case C. Pa decreases and Cb increases. In this example, letCa= 500,qa= 2,
qb= 2,C= 2000,c1= 350,c2= 99,r = 420,D= 3000,d1= 100,d2= 5,s= 1000,ib= 1,
andPb= 3. The optimal solution isPa= 5.36,Cb= 1726.814, andR(Pa,Cb)= 1181.003.
By increasingPb to 3.3, we see thatPa decreases to 5,Cb increases to 2156.558, and
R(Pa,Cb) increases to 1867.28.
In Proposition 4, we discover that, when a firm has control over the price of one of
its products and the capacity level of the other, changes in the production costs of either
product have an impact on both decision variables. If the production cost of the product
over which we have price control increases, then we should raise the price on this product
and also increase the capacity of the other product. In this circumstance, the profit margin
of the product over which we have price control (productA) has decreased. Consequently,
to counter the erosion of the profit margin, we raise the price for productA, which in turn
increases the mean demand for productB, which leads us to increase the amount of capacity
purchased for that product.
In essence, the firm is shifting some of its customer demand from productA to productB.
On the other hand, if the production cost increases on the product whose price we cannot
control, it is best to decrease its capacity and decrease the price of the other product. In this
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case, the firm essentially is dropping its price of productA to entice customers away from
productB, which has become relatively less profitable now that its production costs have
increased. This reasoning also explains why we decrease the price of productA and the
capacity of productB when the capacity investment costs for productB increase. We also
discover that we will increase the price of productA and the capacity of productB if the
mean demand for productA increases by a constant (i.e., the mean demand shifts upward).
In this situation, the market for productA essentially has increased and the firm is able to
gain additional profits by increasing its price and still sell more units. At the same time, the
increased price of productA entices some of the customers to buy productB (i.e., the mean
demand for productB increases) and thus the firm invests in more capacity for productB
to meet the additional expected demand.
If the mean demand for productB changes in the same fashion, however, we will keep the
price of productA the same and increase the capacity for productB. The additional demand
for product B clearly will lead to increasing the investment in capacity for productB.
However, since the firm has no control over the price of productB, he increase in the
demand for productB has no impact on the demand for productA and consequently the
firm has no reason to change its price for productA. Whenc1, which is a measure of
the price elasticity of demand for productA, increases, we will decrease both the price of
product A and the capacity level for productB. In this case, the demand for productA
becomes more sensitive to changes in the price ofA, so the firm optimally decreases its
price, which in turn leads to a decrease in the mean demand for productB and consequently
causes a decrease in the capacity level for productB.
When d1 increases, however, we will not change the price of productA but we will
decrease the capacity for productB. In this situation, the demand for productB has become
more sensitive to the price of productB, and since the price of productB is not controll-
able, the mean demand forB decreases and hence the capacity for productB decreases.
The price of productA remains unchanged because the demand parameters for productB
have no impact on the demand or profitability of productA because the price ofB cannot
be changed.
If either c2 or d2 (which are related to cross-price elasticities) increases, we should
increases both the price of productA and the capacity for productB; the reasoning in this
situation is the same as when there is an increase in the demand for productA is ussed
earlier. When the capacity for productA is increased, then the price of productA and the
capacity for productB will decrease. In this case, the firm lowers its price of productA to
take advantage of the added available capacity, which in turn entices customers away from
productB and leads to a decrease in the optimal capacity of productB. We also observe
that, when the price of the product in the market in which a firm is a price taker increases,
the firm’s optimal strategy will differ depending on the relative sizes ofc1, c2, d1, andd2,
as shown in Example 2.
4. Pricing decisions: Two products with capacity constraints
We now examine the case where both products being manufactured have a given capacity
constraint and the firm must set prices for both of its products. The situation modeled here
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reflects the situation where the high investment costs for new capacity makes it unprofitable
to build new capacity (e.g., because it is forecast that the products are at the end of their
life cycles and therefore it is not possible to recoup the costs of new investment); therefore,
the firm can exercise only pricing control. We again will assume that the demands for
productsA andB are distributed uniformly and that the mean demands are linear in prices.
The profit function is now defined as
R(Pa, Pb)=π(Pa, Pb).
Proposition 5. Under assumptions1 through5, the function R(Pa, Pb) is concave in Pa
and Pb.
Proof: The proof of concavity forR(Pa, Pb) is similar to the proof of Proposition 3 shown
in Appendix A. 2
Proposition 6. Under the assumptions of Proposition5,
1. If C increases, then Pa and Pb increase;
2. If c1 increases, then Pa and Pb decrease;
3. If c2 increases, then Pa and Pb increase.
Given the symmetry of the problem, the parameters D, d1, and d2 will exhibit the same
behavior as their counterparts previously.
Proof: The proofs of parts 1 through 3 are similar to the proof of Proposition 4 shown in
Appendix B. 2
We now illustrate the different cases that are possible when the capacity ofA,Ca,changes.
Example 3. If Ca increases, then any of the following cases are possible.
Example 3, Case A. Pa and Pb decrease. In this example, letCa= 1000, Cb= 1000,
qa= 2, qb= 2, C= 2000, c1= 50, c2= 35, r = 400, D= 3000, d1= 50, d2= 35, and
s= 500. In this case the optimal solution isPa= 98.03, Pb= 109.28, andR(Pa, Pb)=
174435.5.
If we increaseCa from 1000 to 1001, we observe that, with the preceding set of para-
meters,Pa decreases to 98,Pb decreases to 109.27, andR(Pa, Pb) increases to 174474.30.
Example 3, Case B. Pa and Pb increase. In this case, supposeCa= 1000,Cb= 1000,
qa= 2, qb= 2, C= 2000,c1= 1000,c2= 18, r = 400, D= 3000,d1= 21, d2= 19, and
s= 1000. In this case, the optimal solution isPa= 2.24, Pb= 90.91, andR(Pa, Pb)=
72452.92.
In this case, increasingCa to 1001, we find that the optimalPa increases to 3.14, the
optimal Pb increases to 92.22, andR(Pa, Pb) increases to 73461.97.
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Example 3, Case C. Pa decreases and Pb increases. For this example, letCa= 1000,
Cb= 1000, qa= 2, qb= 2, C= 2000, c1= 60, c2= 50, r = 400, D= 3000, d1= 1000,
d2= 19, ands= 250. In this case, the optimal solution isPa= 21.71, Pb= 2.86, and
R(Pa, Pb)= 16293.95.
By increasingCa to 1001, we see thatPa decreases to 21.70,Pb increases to 2.860694,
andR(Pa, Pb) increases to 16299.87.
Note that the case wherePa increases andPb decreases is not possible because this
strategy would adversely affect the amount of productA being sold and thus would not help
the firm take advantage of the additional capacity. In fact, if the firm were able to improve
its profits using this strategy, it would have done so before adding more capacity. Since our
problem is symmetric inA andB, we see thatCb can also exhibit the same behavior.
Example 4. When the production costs of the products change, we have more than one
potential outcome. We next show examples of how changes inqa affect our optimal pricing
strategy. Given the symmetry of the problem, the same outcomes can occur forqb.
As the product cost of productA (qa) increases, we have the following possible cases.
Example 4, Case A. Pa and Pb increase. In this example, letCa= 1000,Cb= 1000,qa= 2,
qb= 2, C= 2000,c1= 50, c2= 35, r = 400, D= 3000,d1= 50, d2= 35, ands= 500. In
this case, the optimal solution isPa= 98.03, Pb= 109.28, andR(Pa, Pb)= 174435.5.
If we increaseqa from 2 to 3, we observe thatPa increases to 98.15,Pb increases to
109.35, andR(Pa, Pb) decreases to 173578.5.
Example 4, Case B. Pa increases and Pb decreases. For this example, letCa= 1000,
Cb= 500,qa= 2,qb= 1,C= 2000,c1= 50,c2= 49,r = 400,D= 1000,d1= 51,d2= 49,
ands= 250. In this case, the optimal solution isPa= 588.41,Pb= 576.96, andR(Pa, Pb)=
696029.8.
In this case, increasingqa to 3, we find that the optimalPa increases to 588.42, the
optimal Pb decreases to 576.95, andR(Pa, Pb) decreases to 695218.8.
It is clear that the case where both prices decrease is not possible, since it only would
adversely affect the profitability of both products. The case wherePa decreases andPb
increases also is not possible, since this strategy would have been pursued before the increase
in production costs if it were possible to increase the profit function’s value.
From Proposition 6, we discover that changes in the termsc1, d1 (related to price elasticity
of demand),c2, andd2 (related to cross-price elasticities) have different effects on the
optimal pricing strategy. When a product’s demand becomes more sensitive to changes in
its price, the optimal strategy is to decrease the price of both products. In this situation,
since the demand for the given product is more sensitive to the price of that product, the firm
will decrease the price of the product, which in turn reduces the mean demand of the other
product. However, to counter this drop in demand and overall profits, the firm also will drop
the price of the other product. On the other hand, if the cross-price elasticity for one of the
products increases, the optimal prices of both products increase. The intuition of this result
essentially is the opposite of the reasoning used to explain the case where price elasticities
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are increasing. When the available capacity for either product changes, the optimal pricing
scheme will be different, depending on the parameters of the mean demand functions. As
shown in Example 3, the values for the price elasticities, cross-price elasticities, and the
ranges of demand determine the optimal strategy that should be implemented. Similarly,
when production costs increase, a firm will either increase the price of the product whose
cost has increased and decrease the price of the other or increase both products’ prices.
Example 4 illustrates that the optimal strategy depends not only on the price elasticities,
cross-price elasticities, and ranges of demand but also on the available capacity and the
production costs for both products.
5. Individual-product optimal decisions
In the previous sections, we examined cases where a firm makes decisions about both of
its products’ capacities and prices simultaneously. We also assumed that the firm was
trying to maximize overall profits (from both product lines). However, often, firms have
separate brand managers for each product line and these brand managers are evaluated
based on the profitability of their product line alone. In that case, the brand manager
will make decisions to maximize profits of his or her own product line alone rather than
to maximize overall profits for the firm. In this section, we analyze how each of the
decisions analyzed in Sections 2–4 would be changed by the fact that they are made by
managers trying to maximize individual-product optimal decisions rather than globally
optimal decisions maximizing the sum of the profits from the two product lines. We therefore
differentiate between theglobally optimaldecisions in Sections 2–4 and theindividually
optimaldecisions in this section.
We also note that, in this section, we pay attention to theorder in which decisions are
made and announced. We show that this order is significant when both managers can make
only pricing decisions but the order does not affect the eventual decisions otherwise. We
explore various assumptions about the managers’ behavior as in the classical Bertrand,
Stackelberg, and collusion models of duopoly.
5.1. Capacity decisions
We return to the case in Section 2 where the firm determines the optimal capacities for
both of its products; however, we now assume that productsA andB have their own brand
managers. Regardless of whether managerA or B makes its capacity decision first; the
profit function for the manager of productA is
R1(Ca) = (Pa − qa) ·
∫ Ca
ua(Pa,Pb)−r
xa · fa(Pa, Pb, xa) dxa
+ (Pa − qa) ·Ca ·
∫ ua(Pa,Pb)+r
Ca
fa(Pa, Pb, xa) dxa − ia ·Ca
where fa(Pa, Pb, xa) = 1/2r andxa is the demand for productA.
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Similarly, productB’s profit function is defined as
R2(Cb) = (Pb − qb) ·
∫ Cb
ub(Pa,Pb)−s
xb · fb(Pa, Pb, xb) dxb
+ (Pb − qb) ·Cb ·
∫ ua(Pa,Pb)+s
Cb
fb(Pa, Pb, xb) dxb − i b ·Cb
where fb(Pa, Pb, xb) = 1/2s andxb is the demand for productB.
Proposition 7. The individually optimal Ca and Cb are the same as the globally optimal
Ca and Cb of Proposition1.
Proof: The result directly follows from the fact that the first order conditions forCa and
Cb are the same as those in Section 2. 2
Proposition 7 states that if brand managers can make only capacity decisions, even if they
make individually optimal decisions, they will end up maximizing global profits, as one
manager’s capacity decision does not affect the other’s decision. In the next subsections,
however, we show that when pricing decisions are involved (which affect the other product’s
demand as well), individually optimal decisions differ from globally optimal decisions.
5.2. Deciding on the price of A and the capacity level of B
We now examine the case where the optimal price ofA, P∗a , and the optimal capacity for
B, C∗b , are determined.
The manager maximizing productA’s profits has the following objective function:
R1(Pa) = (Pa − qa) ·
∫ Ca
ua(Pa,Pb)−r
xa · fa(Pa, Pb, xa) dxa
+ (Pa − qa) ·Ca ·
∫ ua(Pa,Pb)+r
Ca
fa(Pa, Pb, xa) dxa
where fa(Pa, Pb, xa) = 1/2r andxa is the demand for productA.
Note that the manager of productA does not care about the decision that the manager
of productB makes about the capacity for productB. However, the manager of productB
does care about the price of productA, as this affects the demand for productB. Therefore,
the optimalCb is a function of the optimalPa obtained by solving the previous first order
condition. ProductB’s profit function is defined the same asR2(Cb) in the previous
subsection.





C2a − (ua(Pa, Pb)− r )2
]
4r




+ Ca · [ua(Pa, Pb)+ r − Ca]
2r
= 0.
SETTING SINGLE-PERIOD OPTIMAL CAPACITY LEVELS 421
Rearranging terms and substituting in the functions forua(Pa, Pb) andub(Pa, Pb), we
can obtain the optimal value ofPa.
Comparing the optimalPa in this case with the optimalPa derived in Section 3, we clearly
see that the optimal pricing strategy for productA differs depending on whether individu-
ally optimal or globally optimal decisions are being made. The following example shows
globally optimal price and capacity levels can be significantly different than individually
optimal levels.
Example 5. Suppose thatCa = 1700,qa = 3, qb = 2, C = 2000,c1 = 60, c2 = 50,
r = 400, D = 3000,d1 = 55, d2 = 40, s = 250, i b = 1, andPb = 77.98. We obtain a
globally optimal solution ofPa = 76.38, Cb = 2009.886, andR(Pa,Cb) = 228761.18.
ProductA’s profits in this case are 94560.83. For the same parameters, the individually
optimal solutions arePa = 68.82 with a profit for productA of R(Pa) = 105701.13,
and consequentlyCb = 1707.557 with R(Cb) = 111224.07, resulting in a total profit of
216925.20. We see in this case that the manager of productAcan improve the profitability of
productA alone by decreasing its price compared to the globally optimal price of productA;
however, this decreases the sum of the profits from both products.
Interestingly, in general, it is not true that the price of ProductA always will be higher
and the capacity forB always will be higher when decisions are made centrally for both
capacity and price at the same time. The ordering of the solutions will differ based on the
values ofc1, c2, d1, d2, the profit margin ofB, and the capacity ofA.
5.3. Pricing decisions
In Section 4, we discussed the case where a firm simultaneously sets the prices for both its
products. We now examine the case where managers for productsA and B set prices to
optimize individual product profits. Let us assume that the price of productA is set first.
The profit function for productA will be the same as in the previous subsection,R1(Pa).
However, as we can see, the optimal price forA depends on what price will be chosen for
productB. Since we assume that all pricing and capacity information is known, the decision
maker for the price of productA can predict what productB’s optimal pricing strategy will
be after the decision is made regarding the price ofA. ProductB’s profit function is defined
as
R2(Pb) = (Pb − qb) ·
∫ Cb
ub(Pa,Pb)−s
xb · fb(Pa, Pb, xb) dxb
+ (Pb − qb) ·Cb ·
∫ ua(Pa,Pb)+s
Cb
fb(Pa, Pb, xb) dxb − i b ·Cb
where fb(Pa, Pb, xb) = 1/2s and xb is the demand for productB. Therefore, before
determining productA’s optimal price, we solve productB’s problem.
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C2b − (ub(Pa, Pb)− s)2
]
4s




+ Cb · [ub(Pa, Pb)+ s− Cb]
2s
= 0.
From this equation, we can obtain an expression for the optimal price for productB,
which then may be used to find the optimal price for ProductA. To find the optimal price
for ProductA, three different approaches are available: the Bertrand model, the Stackelberg
model, and the collusion model. In the Bertrand model, each product manager assumes that
the price of her or his product does not affect the price of the other. In the Stackelberg, one
manager follows the other’s lead in setting price. In the collusion model, both managers
act together to establish best prices for overall profit.
Bertrand model. In this approach, the manager of productA assumes an optimal price of





C2a − (ua(Pa, P∗b )− r )2
]
4r
+ (Pa − qa) · [Ca − (ua(Pa, P
∗






+ Ca · [ua(Pa, P
∗
b )+ r − Ca]
2r
= 0.
The optimal solution,P∗a , was shown in Section 5.2, wherePb now is substituted with
P∗b . The manager of productB follows the same procedure to obtain a price withP
∗
a as a
parameter. Solving the simultaneous equations for the two prices produces the result.
Stackelberg model. For this approach, the manager of productAassumes that the manager
of productB is the price setter. We substitute the optimalP∗b as a function of Pa directly
into the functionR1(Pa) to obtain
R1(Pa) = (Pa − qa) ·
∫ Ca
ua(Pa,Pb)−r






b , xa) dxa.
The first order condition for this function clearly differs from the Bertrand approach
shown previously sinceP∗b is dependent onPa. Therefore, the optimal price forA differs
from the price obtained in the Bertrand model.
We now illustrate these approaches. For analytical simplicity, we examine the case where
both products have unlimited capacity and the mean demand functions for ProductsA and
B areua(Pa, Pb) = C − c1Pa + c2Pb andub(Pa, Pb) = D − d1Pb + d2Pa, respectively,
and wherec1 > c2, d1 > d2, c1 > d2, andd1 > c2.
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Comparison.
Bertrand model. We begin by finding the optimal price of productB. In this case, prod-
uct B’s profit function is defined as
R2(Pb) = (Pb − qb) · ub(Pa, Pb).
The first order condition is
ub(Pa, Pb)+ (Pb − qb) · ∂ub(Pa, Pb)
∂Pb
= 0.
Rearranging terms, we obtain
P∗b =
D + d2Pa + qbd1
2d1
.
We now solve for the optimal price for productA. The profit function for productA is
R1(Pa) = (Pa − qa) · ua(Pa, Pb).
The first order condition then is
ua(Pa, P
∗




SubstitutingP∗b into this equation and solving forPa, we obtain the optimal price ofA
to be
P∗a =
Dc2+ 2Cd1+ 2c1d1qa + c2d1qb
4c1d1− c2d2 .
Stackelberg model.We again begin by finding the optimal price of productB. The profit
function for productB is the same as in the Bertrand model and hence the optimal price of
B, P∗b , will be the same expression.
The profit function for ProductA is now defined as
R1(Pa) = (Pa − qa) · ua(Pa, P∗b ).
SubstitutingP∗b into the profit function and solving forPa in the first order condition, we
now have the optimal price ofA to be
P∗a =
Dc2+ 2Cd1+ 2c1d1qa + c2d1qb − c2d2qa
4c1d1− 2c2d2 .
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Setting both prices simultaneously (collusion).We now return to the model presented in
Section 4, where the product managers agree to set both prices simultaneously. In other
words, there is collusion in setting the prices for both products to optimize systemwide
profits. We present the optimal prices for the products where both products have no capacity
constraints.
The profit function in this case is
R(Pa, Pb) = (Pa − qa) · ua(Pa, Pb)+ (Pb − qb) · ub(Pa, Pb).
The first order conditions are
ua(Pa, Pb)+ (Pa − qa) · ∂ua(Pa, Pb)
∂Pa
= 0
ub(Pa, Pb)+ (Pb − qb) · ∂ub(Pa, Pb)
∂Pb
= 0.
Solving the equations forPa andPb, we obtain
P∗a =
C + c1qa − d2qb
2c1
+ (c2+ d2) · [2c1(D − c2qa + d1qb)+ (c2+ d2)(C + c1qa − d2qb)]
2c1[4c1d1− (c2+ d2)2]
P∗b =
(c2+ d2) · [2c1(D − c2qa + d1qb)+ (c2+ d2)(C + c1qa − d2qb)]
4c1d1− (c2+ d2)2 .
From the expressions in the three models, we observe that the optimal prices obtained from
the model depend on the price elasticity and cost parameters. We next provide examples
where the optimal prices are different relative to each other based on these parameters.
Example 6. Collusion prices> Stackelberg prices> Bertrand prices. Supposeqa = 2,
qb = 2, C = 2000,c1 = 60, c2 = 30, D = 2000,d1 = 60, andd2 = 20. In this case we
obtain the following results:
Collusion Stackelberg Bertrand
Pa 29.63 24 23.04
Pb 29.51 21.67 21.51
Example 7. Stackelberg prices> Bertrand prices> collusion prices. In this case, let
qa = 100,qb = 2, C = 2500,c1 = 10, c2 = 2, D = 2000,d1 = 79, andd2 = 10. The
resulting prices are
SETTING SINGLE-PERIOD OPTIMAL CAPACITY LEVELS 425
Collusion Stackelberg Bertrand
Pa 167.09 177.99 177.49
Pb 20.89 24.92 24.89
Example 8. (Collusion price of A> Bertrand price of A> Stackelberg price of A) and
(Bertrand price of B> Stackelberg price of B> collusion price of B). For this example,
let qa = 2, qb = 70,C = 2500,c1 = 60,c2 = 50, D = 3000,d1 = 55, andd2 = 40. The
optimal prices are
Collusion Stackelberg Bertrand
Pa 63.64 51.40 62.14
Pb 71 80.96 84.87
From these examples, we may conclude that the timing of pricing decisions, the opti-
mization of individual versus systemwide profits, along with the relative sizes of the price
elasticities and costs can have different impacts on a firm’s optimal pricing strategy.
6. Conclusions and further research
In this paper, we address joint capacity and price decisions for substitutable products. We
show that pricing and capacity decisions are affected greatly by the actual parameters that the
decision makers can control as well as whether decision makers are optimizing systemwide
or individual channel profits. The analytical results we show are based on the assumption
of demands being uniformly distributed. These same conclusions also hold if we substitute
the bivariate normal distribution, provided the parameters used in the model satisfy the first
and second order conditions for concavity. However, further research should focus on more
general demand distributions.
Many research questions on pricing and capacity setting for substitutable products remain
open. For example, returning to the model in Section 2, an interesting model would be one
that assumes that productA is the higher priced product and that, if there is demand in
excess of the available capacity forA, a fraction (α) of the excess demand will shift to
productB. In terms of filling orders for productB, we assume that the firm will first meet
the demand for productB, and if there is any excess capacity, it will be used to fulfill as
much of the fraction of excess demand for productA as possible that has shifted over toB.
In this case, the firm’s profit function is
R′(Ca,Cb) = (Pa − qa) ·
∫ Ca
ua(Pa,Pb)−r




fa(Pa, Pb, xa) dxa+ (Pb − qb)










×α(xa − Ca) fa(Pa, Pb, xa) dxa
]
fb(Pa, Pb, xb) dxb
+ (Pb − qb) · Cb ·
∫ ua(Pa,Pb)+s
Cb
fb(Pa, Pb, xb) dxb − ia · Ca − i b · Cb
Initial research has shown that this extension to the model in Section 2 requires several
conditions to ensure that the conditions for concavity hold. Another interesting case to
explore is where a firm has control over both products’ prices and capacities. (Preliminary
research shows these problems to be extremely challenging.) Furthermore, we consider
only a single period problem in this paper. Further research should also consider multiple
period problems.
Appendix A. Proof of concavity for R(Pa,Cb)
It is sufficient, as in Proposition 1, to show existence of a solution to the first order conditions
and to show that the Hessian,H , of R(Pa,Cb) is negative definite overPa > qa > 0 and





C2a − (ua(Pa, Pb)− r )2
]
4r
+ Ca · [ua(Pa, Pb)+ r − Ca]
2r











= − i b+ [ub(Pa, Pb)+ s− Cb] · (Pb − qb)
2s
= 0. (5)
Solving these equations, we can obtain the optimal values forPa andCb. For the second
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H21 = H12 = ∂
2R(Pa,Cb)
∂Pa∂Cb







= − (Pb − qb)
2s
The sufficient conditions for concavity are
H11 < 0
H22 < 0 (6)
H11H22− H212 > 0 (7)
For H11, notice that∂ua(Pa, Pb)/∂Pa < 0 by assumption 3 and the capacity ofA is
greater than the minimum realizable demand. The first term, therefore, is negative. The
second derivative elements in the next two terms ofH11 vanish, so that two terms both
become negative and yieldH11 < 0. ForH22, negativity follows by assumption 2.
Inequality (7) follows by first noting that the [(Pb−qb)2s · ∂ub(Pa,Pb)∂Pa ]2 terms fromH11H22 and
H212 cancel. The remaining terms are
H11H22− H212 =
[
























which is the sum of two positives by our previous arguments in the proof of (6). The result
follows.
Appendix B. Proof of sensitivity of Pa and Cb to a change inqa
The goal here is to identify the effect of changes in one parameter on the optimal solution
of the first order conditions in (4) and (5). To reflect changes in parameters other than the
decision variables, we add extra terms to the definition ofRso thatR(Pa,Cb) also is written
asR(Pa,Cb,qa) when we explicitly consider changes inqa.
In this case, the first order conditions in (4) and (5) are
∇Cb,Pa R(Pa,Cb,qa) = 0,
where∇Cb,Pa refers to the partial derivatives with respect toCb andPa alone. We suppose
the solution to (4) and (5) is(C∗b, P
∗
a ) whenqa = q∗a .
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We next consider changes fromq∗a to qa = q∗a+ δqa . The solutions of (4) and (5) then are
Pa = P∗a + δPa andCb = C∗b + δCb. We wish to find the sign ofδPa andδCb givenδq > 0.
First, using the first order properties, implicit function theorem, and that∇Cb,Pa R(P∗a ,
C∗b,q
∗
a) = 0, we must have
0 = ∇Cb,Pa R(Pa,Cb,qa)
= ∇Cb,Pa/Pa R(P∗a ,C∗b,q∗a)δPa +∇Cb,Pa/Cb R(P∗a ,C∗b,q∗a)δCb
+∇Cb,Pa/qa R(P∗a ,C∗b,q∗a)δqa + εPaδPa + εCbδCb + εqaδqa
whereεPa , εCb, andεqa all approach 0 asδqa approaches 0. For small changesδqa , we
therefore seekδPa andδCb to solve
∇Cb,Pa/Pa R(P∗a ,C∗b,q∗a)δPa +∇Cb,Pa/Cb R(P∗a ,C∗b,q∗a)δCb
= −∇Cb,Pa/qa R(P∗a ,C∗b,q∗a)δqa .










It is straightforward to show that the determinant of the matrixHqa has the same sign as
the Hessian ofR(Pa,Cb) in the proof of Proposition 3, since the only addition has beenδ


























Since∂ua(Pa, Pb)/∂Pa < 0, the preceding numerator always will be positive. Therefore,
asqa increases,Pa increases.
The change inCb is
δCb =
det





























2s · ∂ub(Pa,Pb)∂Pa 0

det Hqa > 0
.
Since∂ua(Pa, Pb)/∂Pa < 0 and∂ua(Pa, Pb)/∂Pb > 0, the preceding numerator again
is positive by assumption 3. Therefore, asqa increases,Cb increases.
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